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Nepal’s Maoist insurgency is often seen simply as a reaction to 
poverty and exploitation. Such an analysis is at once profoundly 
true and also profoundly inadequate because the pressures 
generated by poverty manifest themselves in many ways, including 
temporary or permanent migration and `normal’ (i.e., 
non-politicised) criminal activity. Other factors are needed to 
explain why an insurgency of the present type has appeared at this 
time in Nepal.1  
The list of contributing causes is a very long one.  Nepal has 
always possessed both ethnic cleavages and mountainous terrain, a 
combination which is itself quite a good predictor of insurgency 
(Ramirez 2004). To this has been added in recent years the spread of 
Communist ideology (of which the Maoists themselves are one 
among many vehicles) and the tactical and organisational skills of 
the leaders of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) which built 
upon the earlier work of Mohan Bikram Singh in the same region of 
                                                 
1 The argument that the insurgency should not be seen in purely economistic terms 
has been made quite frequently (e.g. Gyewali (2000) Lal (2000), Whelpton (2000)) 
but its most forthright presentation is by Saubhagya Shah (2004). My own analysis 
is not based on detailed personal research into the insurgency but reflects many 
years of following Nepalese politics and sometimes contributing to discussion on 
the key issues. I am grateful to David Gellner, Rhoderick Chalmers, Saubhagya 
Shah and Mark Turin for comments on the draft though they are not, of course, in 
any way responsible for the contents.   
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the western hills. The Maoist leadership’s decision to abandon 
constitutional methods was partly dictated by their ideology but 
also probably influenced by electoral arrangements which made it 
more difficult for small parties to gain a stake in the system. 
The growth of the rebellion was greatly aided by the general 
political environment. Externally the Indian authorities failed to 
prevent the rebels making use of Indian territory as a source of 
supplies and as a refuge. Internally, a political culture of 
no-holds-barred struggle for power led governments to misuse the 
police force and administration for partisan advantage and political 
parties (including the Maoists themselves in the pre-`People’s War’ 
stage) to use their activists to over-awe or intimidate opponents. 
Because so many people were already disregarding legal restraints 
in practice, the Maoists’ explicit rejection of the whole legal order 
did not trigger as much public outrage as it might otherwise have 
done.  However, perhaps most crucial as a factor in the rapid 
spread of the insurgency was the inability of the Nepalese state to 
respond fully at the outset because of tension between the palace, 
which was in de facto control of the army, and elected governments.2 
The police campaigns, on which the government was almost solely 
reliant until the Maoists attacked the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in 
2002, was both brutal enough to antagonise local populations and 
too ill-focused and spasmodic to seriously hamper the insurgents’ 
activities.  
                                                 
2  The exact way in which the Indian connection and palace-party tensions affected 
the situation is a matter of controversy.  Shah (2004) argues that India deliberately 
fostered the Maoist insurgency to produce a weaker (and therefore more pliable) 
government in Kathmandu. Some critics of the Nepali Congress governments also 
argue that they could have chosen to deploy the army from the outset but were 
unwilling to do so, whilst Congress politicians allege that the palace and/or the 
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In the present circumstances, it is extremely difficult to 
assess the true extent of the Maoists’ support base. Election results 
suggest that there is widespread backing for the general aims of the 
Nepalese Left, which, were it united, would be the single largest 
political force in the country.3 However the Maoists’ own claim to 
enjoy the enthusiastic backing of the bulk of the population is not 
accepted by any non-Maoist analyst. Gersony (2003: 79) suggests 
that, while they do have solid popular backing in the area of the 
western hills where they were electorally successful in 1991 and 
1992, their influence elsewhere depends principally on an effective 
network of coercion. He believes that, given a free choice, most 
voters in the districts he surveyed would still back the United 
Marxist-Leninist (UML), leaving the Maoists with at most 15% of 
the vote nationwide. Gersony’s analysis (relying considerably on 
interviews with UML activists in district headquarters during 2003) 
is probably over-schematic4 and it should be remembered that, at 
grassroots level, activists can move readily between Leftist factions 
and even maintain links with more than one group simultaneously 
(Hachhethu 2004: 67). Nevertheless, his findings are generally 
plausible, tallying with de Sales’ depiction of both Maoists and the 
security forces as unwelcome intruders into village life or with the 
International Crisis Group’s assessment of most ordinary Nepalese 
owing little allegiance to either side in the conflict (ICG 2005a:18). 
                                                                                                               
army itself was unwilling to co-operate (which was certainly the case in 2001).  
3 Even with Maoist supporters officially boycotting the election, Leftist parties 
gathered around 40% of the vote in the 1999 election (Whelpton 1999: 30). 
4 The study has also been criticised because it was U.S.-funded (and claims have 
been made that Gersony himself was a CIA. agent) but in broad terms its findings 
are plausible. It should be remembered that the Himalayan Border Countries 
Research Project, led by Leo Rose, produced a creditable body of work despite 
being U.S. Defense Department-funded. 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2005. 
 4
Where public opinion was concerned, the Maoists’ advantage has 
been a negative one. They are not particularly popular but an 
opening was created for them because the police and the state 
apparatus in general could not expect the kind of automatic public 
support they would receive if subject to armed attack in stable 
democratic societies. 
Most ordinary citizens of Nepal are trying to survive by 
following the orders of whoever appears more powerful at a 
particular time and place. One hundred and fifty years ago, Jang 
Bahadur Rana told a British officer that in Nepal ‘although 
revolutions (i.e., violent transfers of power) often occurred, … the 
country as a whole did not suffer more from such disturbances than 
England would from a change of ministry; neither the army nor the 
peasantry taking any part in the disputes, and submitting without a 
murmur to the dictates of whichever party might emerge the 
victors.' (Cavenagh 1884: 132). The struggle for power 
unfortunately now has much greater effect on ordinary people’s 
lives but the old tradition of acquiescence survives and was 
encapsulated in a remark made by one Jumla resident in 2003: “We 
obeyed the Ranas and during the Panchayat we did what we were 
told. Democracy came and we followed. Tomorrow there may be 
another system and we will have to listen to them too. We can never 
say we won’t obey” (Mainali 2003).  
Amongst those who do voluntarily and enthusiastically 
support the insurgents, the most marginalized groups, including 
Kham Magars, the Tharus of the western Tarai and dalits, appear 
especially well represented, even though the top leadership of the 
Maoists, as of almost all political organizations in Nepal, is high 
Peace and Democracy in South Asia, Volume 1, Issue 2, 2005. 
 5
caste. 5  If and when the western hills are able to vote for a 
government of their choice free of intimidation, it is conceivable 
that substantial dalit support for the Maoists could cause more 
members of other castes to swing behind the Maoists’ opponents.6 
There could well be a split of votes along caste lines as seen in 
recent years in Bhaktapur, where the highest castes have generally 
backed Congress, the Maharjan agriculturalist caste provided the 
power-base for Rohit’s Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, and the 
lowest castes aligned with the UML. In the Far West, where the 
janajati presence is relatively low, the Thakuris might rally to 
Congress and the dalits to the Maoists whilst Khas/Chhetri 
cultivators either follow their traditional patronage links to the 
Thakuri elite or back the UML. 
At the moment, the actual fighters on the Maoist side of the 
`People’s war’ clearly have a wide variety of motivations. There are 
the `true believers’ who have thoroughly imbibed the CPN 
(Maoist)’s ideology but, particularly among the `volunteers’ 
supporting the better trained and equipped People’s Liberation 
Army `PLA’ units, there are many who have simply been 
conscripted. In western Myagdi in May 2004, for example, one 
journalist was told by villagers: ‘Those who have money have to 
give them cash, those who have food have to give them rice, those 
who have clothes have to give them clothes, and those who have 
                                                 
5 Prachanda (Pushpa Kumar Dahal), Baburam Bhattarai and Krishna Bahadur 
Mahara, are all Brahmins. 
6 I am grateful to Mrigendra Karki for pointing out that this factor may be behind 
the persisting support for the Nepali Congress (Democratic) suggested by a report 
of a victory for its candidates in an election organised by the Maoists themselves 
for `People’s Governments’ in two Achham villages (Kantipur 1/7/04). The 
villagers evidently imagined they were being allowed an unfettered choice and 
were warned by the Maoist commander against repeating their mistake. 
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nothing have to give them one member of the family’ (Ogura 2004: 
123-24). Then there are others for whom joining the Maoists was, 
like enlisting in the Indian or British army, simply a job opportunity. 
The analogy with Gorkha/Gurkha recruitment into foreign armies 
has been frequently drawn. Saubhagya Shah (2004: 193) actually 
cites the existence of this tradition in the hills as a major factor in the 
rise of the insurgency and Prachanda’s own comments about `brave 
and honest’ hillmen echoes the language of many British officers’ 
memoirs (Shah 2004: 219). There is now some concern in Indian 
official circles because in many cases one member of a Nepalese hill 
family may be serving in an Indian army unit whilst another is with 
the Maoists.7 In some cases, families may be divided on issues of 
political principle, in many others the brother (or sister) with the 
Maoists was either given no choice but to join them or saw them as 
just another prospective employer.  
 
Maoists’ Objectives 
Whatever the personal motivation of those carrying guns on their 
behalf, the Maoist leadership’s own objective is to use military force 
either as a direct means to wield political power and/or as a 
bargaining card to leverage themselves into an advantageous 
position in the post-conflict political order. They have for some time 
been claiming that, whatever the eventual institutional set-up in 
Nepal, they would in the interim be prepared to work within a 
multi-party system. However, participation would be restricted to 
parties `opposed to feudalism and imperialism.’'8 A restriction of 
                                                 
7 Hindustan Times, 15/5/05. 
8 Prachanda interview with Time-Online, consulted at www.nepalnews.com, 
23/4/05. 
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this sort has in fact been advocated by a large section of the 
Nepalese Left including (at least in the early 1990s) some members 
of the largest parliamentary Communist party in Nepal, the UML. 
What they then envisaged and what the Maoists would probably 
prefer now is a system something on the lines of the present 
Chinese one, where other political parties do exist but operate 
under broad control of the Communist Party. As a matter of 
short-term tactics the Maoists would probably be willing to operate 
in a more genuinely pluralist system but they hope that their own 
organizational strength, including in particular the framework of 
coercion they have established at village level, would let them gain 
control of the levers of power. There are precedents for Communist 
revolutionaries abandoning pluralism if it proved inconvenient. 
Mao himself, when still trying to obtain power, advocated a 
considerably more liberal system than the one he actually 
eventually established, while Lenin dissolved the Russian 
constituent assembly when his opponents won a majority, and the 
Communist regimes installed in Eastern Europe after World War II 
often started as coalitions with other parties and only afterwards 
established rigid control. 
Apart from the question of the Nepalese Maoists’ intentions 
for their own country, there is also the question of the effect across 
South Asia and beyond. Although the Maoist insurgents in 
Northeast India do not pose an existential threat to India, they are a 
major headache, which would worsen if `People's War' tactics are 
perceived to have succeeded in Nepal. This assessment is shared by 
the Indian security establishment, the US government and also 
(whatever they may say at particular moments for tactical purposes) 
by the Maoists themselves. Li Onesto, the leading western apologist 
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for the Maoists, told an Association for Nepal and Himalayan 
Studies conference in 2002 that `[the Maoists] know that when they 
take control of Nepal, it will upset the stability of the whole region’ 
(ANHS 2003: 68). The choice which the Maoists faced in the 
mid-1990s, between operating in alliance with a larger, more 
moderate Left-wing party, or opting for insurrection is also one 
faced by similar groups in many parts of the developing world. 
Since such groups devote so much of their time to analyzing and 
debating the experience of their counterparts elsewhere, a Maoist 
success in leveraging themselves into a controlling position in 
Nepal would strengthen those advocating the option of 
insurrection in many different countries.  
These international implications are the reason why major 
Western countries still see the Maoists as the greater danger, even 
though Gyanendra’s clamp down on party politics and basic 
freedoms has prompted some in the parties to consider an alliance 
with the Maoists as the lesser of two evils. Gyanendra’s penchant 
for authoritarianism does indeed mirror that of the Maoists: just as 
the latter want dominance for their own Communist Party with a 
pluralist fig leaf, the King envisages some kind of multi-party 
façade with himself pulling the strings. However, neither in South 
Asia nor anywhere else are there groups whom Gyanendra’s 
example would encourage to use violence to establish active 
monarchies. Within Nepal itself, even if Gyanendra managed to 
stabilise some kind of neo-Panchayat system it would not last long 
before succumbing to the kinds of pressures that brought the old 
one down. In contrast, Maoist-style authoritarianism could be 
considerably more difficult to shift. 
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Recommended Action  
None of this means that the Nepalese Maoists could not eventually 
come to function as just one party in a genuine multi-party system 
but this is only likely to happen if the non-Maoist forces are 
sufficiently strong to block any other path. At the moment, those 
forces are in disarray, largely because of Gyanendra’s attempt to 
use the present crisis as a pretext for curbing the constitutional 
parties and of his disregard for the advice which India, the US and 
the UK had all been giving him in the run-up to February 2005.  As 
a first step, he clearly needs to be induced to reverse course through 
a combination of persuasion and pressure. It is unlikely that 
pressure from the political parties themselves will be sufficient to 
achieve this, so the role of external power here remains crucial. The 
three countries mentioned above remain in a good position to 
exercise decisive influence even if the royal regime is able to obtain 
a small amount of military supplies from other sources.  There are 
presently signs of disagreement within both the Indian and U.S. 
administrations on how strong a line to take against the King.  The 
Indian Defence and Home ministries, worried about giving any 
encouragement to India’s own Maoists, would perhaps prefer to 
resume military assistance to the King whilst the Foreign Ministry 
seems more willing to back the constitutional parties in their 
current agitation against the royal regime and also to countenance 
their current (October 2005) overtures towards the Maoists. 9   
Similarly, the American ambassador in Kathmandu has appeared 
more understanding of Gyanendra’s position than some others in 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Weinstein (2005). His assessment of the Indian attitude is 
convincing, though he differs from many other analysts in seeing a real possibility 
of Gyanendra receiving enough Chinese help to offset the loss of Indian support. 
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Washington. However, since February 2005, the embargo on `lethal’ 
military aid maintained by  both countries as well as the U.K. and 
also their repeated public criticism of the King’s actions suggest that 
they are, at present, willing to make use of the leverage they possess. 
Another measure that could be considered is the blocking of 
Nepal’s participation in international peace-keeping operations 
(recommended by Amnesty International recently as a sanction for 
use in connection with human rights abuses). This would deprive 
the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) of a valued source of both funds and 
prestige without altering the military balance within the country in 
favour of the insurgents.  
The next step, as has now been agreed by the main parties, 
would be the reconvening of the 1999 parliament with a mandate to 
establish an all-party government and an agreed position for 
negotiation with the Maoists. The parties would need to reach 
consensus amongst themselves and the King to be willing to follow 
their lead. No one should underestimate the difficulties in 
achieving such an agreement, given the poor track record of both 
the parties and the palace in maintaining trust and co-operation. 
During summer 2005 the obstacles mounted with the growth of 
republican sentiment amongst the mainstream political parties. 
Many of their rank-and-file, who frequently clashed with the police 
in demonstrations against the royal regime, have become more 
attracted to an agreement with the Maoists rather than with the 
king.10  Even with considerable prompting and support from the 
international community, the process would thus be fractious and 
                                                 
10  The Nepali Congress, which had hitherto always been committed to 
constitutional monarchy, voted at its August 2005 convention to remove reference 
to the monarchy from its party statute. 
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time-consuming but, as argued in a recent ICG report (2005b), 
retuning to the constitutional path remains the best of the various 
bad options available to Nepal at the moment.   
The third step, namely bringing the Maoists into the 
settlement process after an understanding has been reached 
between the countries’ other political forces, will be even harder 
despite the apparent flexibility suggested by the insurgents’ 
declaration of a unilateral three months’ ceasefire in September 
2005. Their public bottom-line remains the summoning of a 
constituent assembly but this would be unacceptable to the palace 
unless some kind of agreement was reached informally on the 
position of the monarchy, an agreement which, given the sensitivity 
of the issue for Maoist cadres (and increasingly for cadres of other 
parties), would have to be reached secretly and probably also kept 
secret. There could, though, be public agreement on some kind of 
compromise on the procedural issue – for example, the election of a 
legislature which would be specifically empowered to amend any 
provision of the 1990 constitution or possibly to submit proposed 
amendments to the electorate in a referendum.11 This would have 
the advantage of appearing open to all arrangements, including the 
monarchy itself, to debate but at the same time not granting the 
Maoists precisely what they have for so long been demanding. 
Again, though, reaching agreement would surely be a lengthy 
process, particularly because even when formal principles have 
                                                 
11 Suggestions along these lines have been put forward by a number of individuals. 
One expatriate academic, Professor Surya Subedi of Leeds University in the UK, 
reported that when he himself put it forward there was a positive reaction from 
many of the party representatives but not from the palace (Surya Subedi, personal 
communication). The legal and constitutional difficulties surrounding different 
approaches are discussed in ICG’s June 2005 report (ICG 2005b). 
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been established, the Maoists own role in the interim 
administration would still have to be decided.  
Such negotiations will be particularly important because of 
the likelihood that people without strong, pre-existing loyalties 
would `follow the victor’ and vote for whichever side appeared the 
stronger. In one of my last conversations with the late Rishikesh 
Shaha, a one-time advisor to King Mahendra turned political 
dissident and writer, he confidently predicted that the tendency to 
side with the winner would deliver victory to Baburam Bhattarai 
(whom he knew well personally) if the negotiations then (summer 
2001) underway led to elections. Other observers would be less 
categorical than Shaha, but there is something to what he said. 
Voters will be anxious to make sure that they themselves are not 
excluded from any benefits to be distributed by the winning side, 
but may also feel that backing the stronger faction will help 
guarantee that the conflict does not start again later.12 Everyone 
involved in the negotiation will be aware of this reality and will 
therefore be determined not to let the other side appear to be in a 
stronger position. 
The fourth step would be the holding of elections to 
whatever kind of body was decided upon. Here the first difficulty 
would be ensuring that the campaign and voting could take place 
free of intimidation. While it will be relatively straightforward to 
require the RNA to return to its barracks and to require the Maoists 
                                                 
12 Gersony (2003: 79) suggests that the second calculation would not operate 
because at the time of his research there had been no general massacres or 
large-sale transfers of population. Because of  the difficulty of separating out 
normal economic migration from refugee flows, precise figures cannot be given 
but in Kathmandu government circles internal refugees are now reckoned at 
around half a million and an even greater number may have moved across the 
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to stop overt military operations (which they themselves in any case 
unilaterally suspended in September 2005), covert intimidation by 
the Maoists will be much more difficult to detect and prevent. The 
scale of the problem is clearly illustrated by the upsurge in Maoist 
demands for `donations’ that occurred during the 2001 ceasefire.13A 
very large monitoring effort will be required – not just a few more 
`Aidocrats …in their air-conditioned SUVs’, to borrow C.K. Lal’s 
dismissive characterisation of the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR) inspection effort 
(Lal 2005). Ideally there ought also to be some kind of peacekeeping 
force from outside South Asia with Maoist fighters required either 
to surrender their weapons to the peacekeepers or to move to 
`holding areas’ under international supervision.14 It will also help if 
a start has already been made on the rehabilitation of the Maoists’ 
full-time fighters. The Maoist leadership’s own preferred plan is 
their amalgamation into a new national army but a large standing 
army for post-conflict Nepal would be a financial burden and also 
politically dangerous, whilst any merger proposal will be a sticking 
point for the RNA and the palace, so the former insurgents will 
have to be found civilian roles (Kumar 2003).  
The key point for steps three and four is that unless they are 
put under very strong pressure, the King and the Maoists are 
unlikely to yield what they presently possess: in Gyanendra’s case, 
                                                                                                               
open border into India.  
13  Up to now (early October 2005), the Maoist’s unilateral ceasefire, which 
commenced at the beginning of September, has not seen any increase in their 
activities in urban areas but extortion and abductions are continuing throughout 
the countryside, as are search operations by the security forces. 
14 In an interview with the author (Kathmandu, 9/8/05), UML leader Madhav 
Kumar Nepal argued that such an arrangement would be essential for a fair 
election to take place. 
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effective control of the urban areas, and in the insurgents’, their 
status as the strongest force at village level. Above all, if genuine 
supporters of the Maoists are a minority outside their original 
mid-western stronghold, the Maoist leadership will be even more 
anxious for a dominant role in interim arrangements and Maoists at 
village level will have every incentive to continue covert 
intimidation.  
As already argued, continuing international pressure on the 
palace is essential to start the whole process but once a government 
of all the main parliamentary parties is established, pressure on the 
Maoists will also be necessary. This is why the Indians were 
previously urging the King not only to mend fences with the 
political parties but also to make more effective use of the RNA. The 
army has been rightly and heavily criticized for human right abuses 
but there are also grounds for worry about its professional 
competence. Failure to disclose information about persons in 
military custody is in some cases a deliberate intimidatory tactic but 
in other cases may reflect organisational failure in transferring and 
acting on information. The latter may well be the reason why some 
of the Maoists’ attacks on district headquarters have been so costly, 
even when it has later transpired that there were prior indications 
that an attack would take place. Military action on its own will not 
end the insurgency but a negotiated settlement acceptable to other 
parties will result in Maoists holding considerably less power at the 
village level than they do at present and the Maoists can only be 
expected to accept this if the alternative is the slow erosion of their 
present position. Bringing the army and police themselves under 
the rule of law and then gradually extending the areas of the 
country where they can maintain a basic level of security will be 
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one important way of ensuring this. As with insurgencies in India, 
the `time-honoured combination of coercive and accommodative 
measures’ (Manor 1998: 28) will be needed to restore peace in 
Nepal. 
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